This paper is among the first to investigate the effect of a prior investment banking relationship on merger advisory fees paid by acquiring firms. We find that acquiring firms pay a higher fee to advisors when they have had a continuing relationship and a lower fee when they switch to an advisor with whom they have had no prior relationship. We develop a measure of relationship strength between an acquiring firm and its merger advisor based on previous debt, equity and merger transactions completed by the acquiring firm. We also examine the relationship between a merger advisor's reputation and its ability to retain clients.
Introduction
While previous studies have looked at various factors impacting (cross-sectionally) merger advisory fees, little attention has been paid to the inter-temporal relationship among M and A advisors and client firms. 1 In particular, does a long-term relationship developed between an acquiring firm and an advisory firm (e.g. investment bank) result in higher or lower M and A fees? 2 Further, does a long-term relationship get rewarded in the capital market by the acquirer earning higher abnormal returns on a merger announcement compared to the case where the acquirer has had no previous relationship with the advisor or has switched to a new advisor.
Using a measure of advisor relationships based on prior transactions completed by a client firm with an advisor (henceforth investment bank) we find that: (i) acquiring firms pay a higher fee to advisors with whom they have had a long-term relationship and (ii) these higher fees are not rewarded by higher abnormal returns for such firms on M and A announcements. Overall, these results are consistent the existence of either switching costs and/or other benefits arising from continuing investment banking relationships -such as better service and derived relationship certification benefits. Indeed, we find that a client is more likely to switch when the M and A advisor is not a top tier investment bank (i.e. has a lower reputation).
Section 2 of the paper provides an overview of the merger advisory market and describes the sample and variables used. Section 3 describes the hypotheses and empirical tests. Section 4 presents a summary and conclusion.
1 Hunter and Walker (1990) , McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( , 1992 and Rau (2000) among others.
Overview of the US M and A Market
The merger advisory market is an important source of revenue for most large investment and commercial banks in the United States. In 1998, M and A transactions amounted to over $800 billion with merger advising accounting for as much as 40% of the total combined revenue obtained from merger advising and public underwriting of some top investment and commercial banks (See Table 1 ). Entry into this market has never been subject to significant regulatory barriers. In particular, while the Glass-Steagall Act (prior to 1999) inhibited commercial banks' provision of underwriting services, no such barrier inhibited their provision of M and A advisory services. Table 2 provides a list of the top 10 advisors (based on market share) for mergers between public companies in the U.S. for each year from 1985 to 1998. First, a striking feature is that most of the top 10 advisors are "traditional" investment banks and not commercial banks. This changes towards the end of the sample period when J.P. Morgan, Chase Manhattan and NationsBank were among the top 10 advisors. Second, there appears to be considerable persistence in market share. For example, Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley are in the top 5 throughout the sample period. Third, most of the top merger advisors are also top underwriters. Many of the banks listed in Table 2 also have a high ranking in the underwriting reputation tables of Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) .
Sample selection
The sample of mergers used for this study were obtained from the Security Data
Company (SDC) database of mergers and new capital issues. The SDC database has a record of new public issues, from 1970, and a record of merger transactions from 1979. We select all mergers and tender offers that were successfully completed for which information on total advisory fees paid by the acquiring firm were available. 4 Importantly, these total fees (as defined by SDC) do not include fees paid for any bridge loan financing or fees paid for any subsequent debt or equity issues used to finance the merger. 5 We include in our sample those mergers announced and completed over the Jan 1, 1985 to Oct 1, 1998 period. 6 SDC defines a "merger" as a transaction where the acquiring firm owned less than 50% of the target before the transaction and owned 100% of the target at the end of the transaction.
Of these mergers, we chose transactions where the acquiring firm had stock price data on the CRSP database one month prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. The matching with the CRSP database was done using the cusip symbol of the acquiring firm.
This matching resulted in a sample of 817 mergers. Using this list of cusips, we went back to the SDC database and recorded all debt, equity and merger transactions that were completed by the acquiring firm in the four years prior to the merger transaction. These data were used to establish measures of relationship strength between the M and A acquirers and their advisors. 4 Henceforth, we shall collectively refer to mergers and tender offers as mergers. 5 We excluded target firms for the very reason that we are concerned about the effects of long-term relationships and M and A fees and targets cease to exist on an M and A completion. We also excluded LBO's from the sample. 6 The reason for starting in 1985 (and not 1979, which is the year that the merger database starts) is as follows: To properly calculate the measure of relationship strength, one needs data on all prior debt, equity and merger transactions. Since merger data begins only from 1979, the earliest we can begin is 1983. However, the Specifically, we define prior relationships to include prior debt and equity underwriting for the acquiring firms as well as provision of M and A services within a time period of four years before the announcement date of the transaction. 7 This resulted in 656 mergers for which the acquiring firm had at least one transaction in the four years preceding the announcement date of the merger. Of these, there were 45 transactions where the only role of the advisor was to provide a fairness opinion. Since this is a relatively minor role (see McLaughlin (1992) ), we exclude these transactions. The resulting sample of 611 transactions formed our base sample. Company specific data were obtained using the SDC database and the CRSP database. Due to the long time period over which this study extends, we convert all nominal dollar values into real values for the year 1998 using the chain weighted GDP deflator.
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We employ the log of total fees (total compensation for advisory services) as well as total fees paid as a percentage of transaction value as alternative measures of the dependent variable. Table 3 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis in Sections 3 and 4. In this sub-section, we describe in detail the construction of the variables used to proxy for M and A advisor reputation, relationships and switching.
Construction of Reputation and Relationship measures
robustness checks of the relationship strength measure use up to 6 years of data on prior merger transactions. This implies that the earliest we can start is 1985. In any case, availability of fee data in this period is sparse. 7 There is nothing sacrosanct about this time period. In one of the robustness checks, we define relationships based on shorter and longer time periods. These do not alter the results. The choice of four years was dictated by balancing sample size (short duration implies fewer companies would satisfy the requirement of having a transaction within the time period) versus relationship continuity (how much of a relationship do you really have if you have had no transactions in many years?) 8 The results change very little if nominal values are used.
Reputation of Advisor
We use the tier of an advisor, based on its market share of total M and A transactions as the proxy for reputation. Market share of an advisor in any given year is defined as the ratio of the total dollar value of all successful mergers in that year where the given advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all successful mergers in the same year. In merger transactions where more than one advisor was retained, all advisors are given full credit for the deal.
In the event of a merger between two advisors (banks), the market share of the combined entity is set equal to the sum of the market shares of the two individual banks. For example, in the computation of market share of Bankers Trust (BT) and Wolfensohn after their 1996 merger, the market share of BT Wolfensohn in the year subsequent to the completion of their merger would be the sum of the market shares of BT and Wolfensohn in the previous year.
The market share of a bank (lagged by one year) is used to classify each advisor into one of three possible reputational tiers. Banks that rank from 1 through 5 (i.e. in the top 5) are classified as top tier, banks that rank from 6 through 20 are classified as middle tier, and banks below this are classified as bottom tier. For transactions where multiple advisors were retained, the tier of the advisor with the largest market share is used in the empirical analysis. 
Relationship Strength
One needs to identify a reasonable time frame for the measurement of relationships.
As described above, the relationship time frame is chosen as four years. Thus, all references 9 Use of market share as a proxy for reputation is justified by Megginson and Weiss (1991) . They document that reputation measures based on market share have a high correlation with the ranking of Carter and Manaster (1990) .
to prior transactions in this paper should be read as transactions completed by the acquiring firm in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2000) use a three-year time period for studying underwriting relationships and Nanda and Warther (1998) use a five-year time period for measuring underwriting relationships. In robustness checks of our results, we varied the time period used to define relationships with little effect on the regression results.
Relationship strength is thus defined as the ratio of two values. The denominator is the total dollar value of all transactions of debt, equity and mergers completed by the acquiring firm over the past four years. 10 The numerator is calculated as the sum of the following. The merger advisor is given full credit (in $ terms) for any capital raising issue where it was retained as a lead manager by the acquiring firm, and any prior mergers where it was retained in an advisory capacity over the previous four years. For any public issue where the given merger advisor was retained as a manager, but not as the lead manager, it is given 50% of the credit (in $ terms). 11 This relationship strength measure will always lie between zero and one.
A value of one indicates the strongest possible relationship and a value of zero indicates no relationship. The bank that has the highest relationship strength with the acquiring firm is defined as its lead bank.
12 10 The current merger transaction is excluded in all calculations of relationship strength. 11 Let us clarify this with an example. Let an acquiring firm have 3 prior transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger. Two are debt issues for $100 million each and one is a merger transaction for $ 25 million. The merger advisor retained in the current transaction was retained as the lead manager in one debt issue, a manager (but not lead) in one issue and was retained as the merger advisor in the prior merger transaction. Then, the relationship strength measure would be (100 (lead in debt) + 50 (not lead in debt) + 25)/ 225 = 0.78. 12 An alternate way to define relationship strength is to use only banks that were retained as lead managers. If we use this definition, the definition of the lead bank changes only in 18 out of the 611 cases. Thus, the identity of the lead bank is quite robust to changes in the strength measure.
A bank that gets a higher fraction of the total amount of business that a given client firm generates will have a higher value of relationship strength than other banks that get a lower fraction. Holding the total amount of business constant, the bank with higher relationship strength has a higher level of relationship interaction with the client firm. 
Switching of Advisors
Finally, with respect to a firm switching advisors, a firm is said to have switched if it chooses a merger advisor who it has not retained in any capacity i.e. in any of its prior debt, equity or merger transactions at any time in the prior four years. 
Summary statistics
Figures 1 and 2 graphically depict the variation of percentage fees and the log of the total fee (in $ million) with the log of the transaction value (in $ million). Note that there is a fairly large variation in fees charged, both in absolute and percentage terms for transactions of all sizes. For example, there does not appear to be the type of clustering of fees at a particular percentage fee akin to that obtained in the IPO underwriting market (i.e. 7%) by Chen and Ritter (2000) . Table 4 Panel A shows some descriptive statistics for this sample. The average fee for the entire time period is $3.94 million and the average transaction value is $1.37 billion.
Firms switched to a new M and A advisor with whom they had no relationship (in the past four years) 32% of the time. This figure is similar to that obtained by Krigman, Shaw and 13 As with the market share variable, the relationship strength variable also accounts for mergers among banks. Thus, an acquiring firm that had a relationship with either Bankers Trust or Wolfensohn prior to their merger would be classified as having a relationship with BT Wolfensohn in years subsequent to the merger between BT and Wolfensohn. We avoid double counting to ensure that the relationship strength measure is always less than or equal to 1. 14 A bank that was not a lead manager but a manager in an underwriting was assumed to have had a relationship.
Womack (2000) and James (1992) 
Multivariate tests
Tables 5A and B show the results of OLS regressions of log of the total merger advisory fees (Table 5A ) and the merger fee percent (Table 5B) In what follows, we concentrate on the level of fee results since in virtually all cases, the percentage fees results are consistent with those found using the levels. Moreover,
McLaughlin (1992) also concentrated on explaining fee levels. The fit of the regression model in Table 5A is reasonably good with an R 2 of about 72%. The coefficient of the log of the transaction value is positive and significant indicating that larger transactions have higher fees in absolute terms. The duration of time (in months) between the announcement date of a merger and the completion date also has a positive effect on fees paid. Similarly, the tender offer dummy has a positive effect on fees paid. However, the dummy for a hostile deal is not statistically significant. The number of advisors retained has a positive effect on fees while dummy variables for top and middle tier advisors are highly significant and positive. Many of these empirical results corroborate earlier work done by Mclaughlin (1992) and Hunter and Walker (1990) .
With respect to relationships and switching which is the major focus of this paper, Model 1 in Table 5A suggests that switching (proxied by a switching dummy) reduces the level of fees by about 22% and percentage fees (Table 5B ) by about 13%. This implies a 15 The main results are all robust to exclusion of the fixed effect variables.
significant loyalty premium is paid by firms that retain the same M and A advisor over time.
As noted earlier, this result is consistent with either considerable other relationship benefits accruing to a firm from retaining the same M and A advisor (e.g. service efficiency) and/or a material financial cost of switching advisors other than fees paid.
McLaughlin (1992) found that the reputation of an M and A advisor had a strong effect on total fees paid. The univariate results presented earlier confirmed this finding. It is interesting to examine whether the fee benefits of switching vary across the tier or quality of the advisor. To examine this, the switching dummy is interacted with the tier of the advisor (Model 2) in Tables 5A and B. The magnitudes of the coefficients clearly increase as we go from top tier advisors to bottom tier advisors indicating that bottom tier advisors are willing to
give a larger fee discount to firms that switch.
Finally, Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2000) found that firms are more likely to switch (for underwriting their seasoned equity offering) to top tier banks if the bank they used at the time of their IPO was not a top tier bank. To further explore this result, we classify firms that switch into three categories -(1) Those that switch to a bank that has the same tier as their current lead bank (lateral switches). (2) Those that switch to a bank that has a higher tier than their current lead bank (upward switches). (3) Those that switch to a bank that has a lower tier than their current lead bank (downward switches). We then compute the fee regressions replacing the single switch dummy with the three switch variables -lateral, upward and downward. The results (Model 3 in Tables 5A and B) indicate that firms that switch downwards appear to get the maximum fee benefit or reduction, while those that switch upwards get the least fee reduction.
However, the previous results may be biased if the decision to switch is related to any of the independent variables in the OLS regression. The idea can be illustrated by the following example: Say one is able to observe the actual net benefit (cost) of switching or a proxy for this. Denote this by NB. Then, NB as an independent variable in the regression using OLS would capture the marginal effect of the net benefit on fees charged. The problem however is that NB is not observed. Rather, we only observe the actual decision to switch (a dichotomous variable) that is clearly determined by the underlying latent variable NB. In this case, Heckman (1979) has shown that the OLS estimates of the coefficient of switching may be biased.
To account for this effect, one can use the two-stage least squares technique suggested by Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981) to adjust the coefficient estimates and their standard errors. The method involves estimation of a probit model with the switching dummy as the dependent variable. Next, a function of the fitted values of the probability of switching from the first stage probit model is used in a second stage maximum likelihood estimation. We implement this approach using the LIMDEP 7.1 software.
Potentially, transaction and advisor characteristics could have an effect on switching.
The probability of switching could also depend on the industry that the target operates in and the year of announcement of the merger (Whether the merger took place during a merger boom or not, etc.). To account for all of these effects, we include all of these variables in the probit estimation model.
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These results are shown in Table 6A for fee levels and 6B for percentage fees. Again we concentrate the discussion on the fee level regression. The first column in Table 6A displays the results of the first stage (probit model) of the Heckman correction regression.
Firms are more likely to switch in tender offers. Consistent with the results in Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2000) , firms are also more likely to switch if their lead bank is not a top tier advisor. Frequent transactors are less likely to switch to an unrelated bank. The second column of Table 6A 
Robustness Checks
Tables 8A and B present some robustness checks of these results. Inclusion of transactions where the acquiring firm had no prior M and A or debt or equity transactions does not affect the results of a fee reduction from switching. Likewise, inclusion of transactions where the only role of the advisor was to provide a fairness opinion did not alter the switching results. Interestingly, the no transaction dummy is negative in both cases and significant in the model that includes fairness opinions indicating that banks may give a fee reduction to establish a new relationship with a firm they had no prior relationship with.
Moreover, if we define relationship strength using only lead engagements, then this measure has a positive significant effect on fees. Thus, our primary findings, i.e., presence of a switching fee discount (or reduction) and no reduction in fee for a continuing relationship, appear to be robust to different specifications.
M and A Advisors, Relationships and Abnormal Returns
So far, the analysis has focused on the costs or benefits of an investment banking relationship purely in terms of the fees paid. Clearly, clients could get "indirect" benefits of relationships that are not related to fees. These include (but are not limited to) better quality of service during the merger negotiations, better bargaining with targets, obtaining other services between transactions, etc. Unfortunately, data limitations preclude measurement of many such "indirect" benefits. One possible indirect benefit that is easier to measure is the announcement return to the client firm. Specifically, clients that use a relationship bank with experience and knowledge of the client as its M and A advisor may provide a more credible signal to the financial markets as to the value-added of a proposed merger transaction than a client who hires, as an M and A advisor, a bank with no previous track record with that client. That is, relationship based M and A advisors may provide valuable "certification" benefits to their clients. 17 To evaluate these potential certification effects, we calculate abnormal returns for the acquiring firm using a 11-day window [days (-5,0,+5)] around the announcement date of the merger.
18 Table 9 presents results for univariate tests of the relation between switching and abnormal returns. We classify merger transactions in the sample into those that had positive abnormal returns on the announcement date and those that had negative abnormal returns. We conduct a χ 2 of independence between switching and the sign of the abnormal return. We find that these two are independent at conventional levels of significance. The mean abnormal returns present a similar picture. The mean abnormal return for firms that switch is -0.47%
and for those that do not is -0.99%. These two values do not differ significantly from each 17 Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) and others have found that firms that retain an investment bank with whom they had a prior commercial banking relationship for their debt issues get a higher price for their bonds. Similarly, James and Weir (1990) find that IPO's of firms that had a pre-existing commercial banking relationship are underpriced much less than IPO's of firms that did not have any pre-existing commercial banking relationship. 18 Sufficient data was not available to estimate the market model for all the acquiring firms. Those firms with less than 240 valid returns in days (-300,-60) are excluded from this analysis. Day 0 is the announcement date of the merger.
other at conventional levels of significance. Therefore, the higher M and A fees charged by relationship banks do not appear to be compensation for a higher announcement returns to the acquiring firms' stockholders.
Summary and Conclusions
This study examined the effects of investment banking relationships on M and A advisory fees paid by acquiring firms. We find acquiring firms pay higher fees when they choose a bank with whom they have had a continuing relationship and lower fees when they switch. We find evidence that indicates that reputation of a merger advisor also plays a role in the setting of fees. We developed a measure of the strength of the relationship between an acquiring firm and its merger advisor. Using this variable, we could find no evidence of a relationship discount, i.e. that non-switching firms with long term relationships paid lower M and A fees. These findings are consistent with potential indirect benefits arising from maintaining relationships in the M and A market. Examination of merger announcement returns however, indicated no significant difference between acquiring firms that did not switch and those that did. This suggests that acquiring firms accrue some other non-fee related benefits from retaining inside or relationship banks and/or face some other non-pecuniary costs of switching to outside banks. Table 1 This table shows the rank of any advisor that was in the top 10 (in terms of market share) in any year between 1985 and 1998. In years where the advisor's rank is below 10, the corresponding table entry is blank. Market share is defined as the total dollar value of mergers and acquisitions where the given advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all mergers and acquisitions in a given calender year. For mergers where more than one advisor is retained, all advisors are given full credit for the transaction. This table gives credit to the actual subsidiary of the investment or commercial bank that was retained as an advisor and not the parent company. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 This table shows the rank of any advisor that was in the top 10 (in terms of market share) in any year between 1985 and 1998. In years where the advisor's rank is below 10, the corresponding table entry is blank. Market share is defined as the total dollar value of mergers and acquisitions where the given advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all mergers and acquisitions in a given calender year. For mergers where more than one advisor is retained, all advisors are given full credit for the transaction. This table gives credit to the actual subsidiary of the investment or commercial bank that was retained as an advisor and not the parent company. Log transaction value Log of transaction value which is the total consideration offered to the target in $ million. For mergers involving stock, the stock was valued at the price one day before the announcement date of the merger.
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Duration
Months from the first public announcement date of the merger transaction to completion date.
Number of advisors
Variable equal to the number of advisors retained by the acquiring firm for the given merger.
Tender offer dummy Dummy set to 1 if the merger was also associated with a tender offer
Hostile bid dummy Dummy set to 1 if the merger was a hostile bid Switch Dummy set to 1 if the given advisor had not been retained by the acquiring firm in any of its prior debt, equity or merger transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger.
Relationship strength This is computed by taking the ratio of the total dollar value of issues of debt and equity in which the merger advisor was the lead manager, half of the dollar value of issues in which the advisor was not lead manager, but was a manager, and the dollar value of previous merger transactions in which the given advisor was retained by the acquiring firm to the total dollar value of all debt, equity and merger transactions by the firm in the previous four years. This measure will always be between 0 and 1. When a firm switches, relationship strength will be (by definition) equal to zero. In case of mergers between two merger advisors, all firms that had a relationship with either merger advisor are considered to have a relationship with the combined entity. See footnote 11 for an example.
Lead bank of acquiring firm The bank that had the highest relationship strength with the acquiring firm. 
Variable Used Description
Market Share of advisor
The ratio of the total $ value of transactions where any acquiring firm retained the given merger advisor in an advisory capacity in a given year to the total $ value of all mergers in that year.
Top tier advisor dummy Dummy set to 1 if the investment bank ranked 1-5 in M&A market share computation in the calendar year prior to the announcement of the merger.
Medium tier advisor dummy Dummy set to 1 if the investment bank ranked 6-20 in M&A market share computation in the calendar year prior to the announcement of the merger.
Tier of advisor Integer variable that takes a value of 0 if the advisor retained by the acquiring firm was a top tier bank, 1 if the advisor retained was a middle tier bank and 2 if the advisor retained was a bottom tier bank.
Tier of lead bank
Integer variable that takes a value of 0 if the lead bank of the acquiring firm was a top tier bank, 1 if the lead bank was a middle tier bank and 2 if the lead bank was a bottom tier bank.
Market Value of the acquiring firm Market value of equity of the acquirer one month prior to the announcement date of the merger.
Number of Transactions Total Number of capital market transactions (debt, equity or mergers) completed by the acquiring firm in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger.
Frequent transactor An acquiring firm that had four or more transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger.
Infrequent transactor An acquiring firm that had less than four transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger.
Downward switch Dummy set to 1 when the acquiring firm switched to a merger advisor that had a lower tier than its previous lead bank.
Upward switch Dummy set to 1 when the acquiring firm switched to a merger advisor that had a higher tier than its previous lead bank.
Lateral switch Dummy set to 1 when the acquiring firm switched to a merger advisor that had the same tier as its previous lead bank. 
Log of Transaction Value (in $ million) Log of Total fees (in $ million)
This panel shows summary statistics for the sample used for empirical analysis in this paper. All absolute dollar values are converted into 1998 dollars using the chain weighted GDP deflator. See Table 3 Panel B makes univariate comparisons of total fees, percentage fees, transaction value, market value of the acquiring firm with respect to three qualitative variables -(1) transactions where acquiring firms switched and where they did not (2) transactions where the acquiring firms were frequent transactors (had 4 or more transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger) and transactions where the acquiring firms were infrequent transactors (had less than four transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger) (3) transactions where the acquiring firms chose top, middle and bottom tier advisors. Table 4 Panel B-Univariate comparisons Panel C presents cross tabulation results between tier of the advisor and the dummy for frequent transactors and between the dummy for switching and the dummy for frequent transactors. An acquiring firm was classified as a frequent transactor if it had four or more transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger. If the acquiring firm had less than four transactions in the four years prior to the announcement of the merger, it was classified as an infrequent transactor. Test for independence of dummy for frequent transactor and dummy for switching
Value of χ 2 (1) Statistic = 14.12, pvalue = 0.00
Table 4 Panel C-Cross Tabulations
Estimates of OLS regressions to estimate the impact of switching on merger fees. The dependent variable is the log of the total fees paid. Fixed effect dummies for the target's 2 digit SIC code and the year of announcement are included in the models but not included in the table to conserve space. All variables relating to prior transactions and relationship with the investement bank use a four year period prior to the announcement of the merger transaction. Coefficient estimates and their p-values are reported. Standard errors include the White correction for heteroscedasticity.The switch dummy takes a value of 1 when the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor with whom it had no prior relationship. An upward switch is one where the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor that had a higher tier than its previous lead bank. A lateral switch is one where the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor that had the same tier as its previous lead bank. A downward switch is one where the acquiring firm chose a merger advisor that had a lower tier than its previous lead bank. 
